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PROTECTIVE SEARCHES, PAT-DOWNS,
OR FRISKS?: THE SCOPE OF THE
PERMISSIBLE INTRUSION TO
ASCERTAIN IF A DETAINED PERSON IS
ARMED
THOMAS K. CLANCY*
I. INTRODUCTION
A protective search of suspects for weapons is a limited intrusion de-
signed solely to insure the safety of the police officer and others while
the officer is conducting a criminal investigation.1 Although it is a well-
established police procedure, of continuing controversy is the basic no-
tion of what a protective search is, that is, whether it permits an intru-
sion underneath the surface of a person's clothing or whether it permits
merely a "pat-down" or "frisk" of the exterior of the person's clothing.
By examining this question, more fundamental questions about the na-
ture of such protective searches arise: what level of certainty may the
officer obtain regarding whether the suspect is unarmed; how intensive
may the intrusion be; and what weapons may the police look for? As
will be seen, the answers to these questions largely determine the per-
missible scope of a protective search.
The constitutionalization of protective searches has it origins in
Terry v. Ohio,3 the Supreme Court case that first addressed the issue and
brought the police practice of checking for weapons persons they ac-
* Adjunct, University of Baltimore School of Law. Lecturer, University of Maryland
School of Law. Assistant Attorney General, State of Maryland. Visiting Assistant Professor,
Vermont Law School (1995). J.D., Vermont Law School. B.A., University of Notre Dame.
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
2. Some issues are well settled, such as the level of individualized suspicion needed for
such actions, see note 22 infra, and the breadth of the search, that is, the parameters of the
area into which the officers may permissibly look or examine, and this article does not ad-
dress those settled principles.
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The police practice of stopping and frisking suspicious persons was
a "time-honored police procedure" pre-dating Terry but the constitutionality of the practice
was largely ignored or avoided prior to Terry. See Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and
the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 40-46 (1968).
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costed within the protections of the Fourth Amendment.4 The Court le-
gitimated the practice of protective searches, setting forth the standards
and justification for such intrusions. In Part II, this article reviews Terry
and Sibron v. New York,5 which is the other initial Supreme Court case
addressing the constitutionality of a protective search. Part III examines
subsequent Supreme Court authority discussing protective searches. As
those Parts demonstrate, Terry and Sibron are characterized by ambigu-
ous language, and subsequent Supreme Court authority has done little
to clarify the meaning of those cases. The ambiguities have caused
much discord in the lower courts, which have adopted differing interpre-
tations of the basic precepts of what constitutes a protective search.
Those differing interpretations are outlined in Part IV.
The remaining portions of this article seek to clarify the proper
scope of a protective search. To do so, some myths regarding the proper
scope of a protective search must be dispelled. Principally, as discussed
in Part V, this involves rejecting artificial limits on a protective search,
such as any pat-down requirement. This in turn requires establishing
that a least intrusive means analysis is not a part of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, that the fear of false testimony by police officers does not
justify a pat-down requirement, and that a pat-down requirement is not
supported by the rationale that justifies utilization of bright-line rules.
After eliminating those artificial limitations on the scope of a protec-
tive search, its proper scope is discussed in Part VI. That Part estab-
lishes that three interrelated considerations serve to measure the proper
scope of a protective search. The first, and most important, is the level
of assurance the police may obtain in satisfying themselves that the sus-
pect they are confronting is not armed. The second concerns the inten-
sity of the search, which illuminates the limits on the analogy between
searches incident to arrest and protective searches. The third factor re-
fers to limits on the types of weapons for which a search can be made. It
will be argued that a police officer may obtain only reasonable assur-
ance that the suspect is not armed, that the officer may only examine
those areas that may contain a weapon, and that, absent reason to be-
4. U.S. CONST., amend. IV, provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
5. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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lieve that the suspect is harboring an unusual weapon, the officer may
only examine those areas where fairly large objects, such as knives and
guns, may be concealed. Within that framework, the scope of any pro-
tective search is based on the circumstances of each case, guided by the
principle that the scope of the intrusion must be reasonably related to its
purpose. Part VII contains some concluding remarks.
II. SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY: TERRYAND SIBRON
In Terry v. Ohio,6 the Court was confronted with a situation where a
police officer, Detective McFadden, reasonably believed that Terry and
two other men he had confronted were planning to rob a store
McFadden grabbed Terry and "patted down the outside of his cloth-
ing."8 He felt a pistol in the left breast pocket of Terry's overcoat and
reached in but was unable to remove the gun. At that point, the officer
ordered all three men into a store and, as they went in, McFadden re-
moved Terry's coat and recovered the gun. He then proceeded to pat
down the outer clothing of the other two men, Chilton and Katz.
McFadden discovered a revolver in the outer pocket of the overcoat of
Chilton and seized it. "The officer testified that he only patted the men
down to see whether they had weapons, and that he did not put his
hands beneath the outer garments of either Terry or Chilton until he felt
their guns. 9
Based on these facts, the Supreme Court, utilizing a balancing test, °
considered the competing governmental and individual interests in-
volved in the officer's "invasion of Terry's personal security by search-
ing him for weapons" during the course of his investigation of the possi-
ble criminal activity." The Court concluded that a limited intrusion
designed to ascertain if the suspect is armed was justified. The Court
recognized that such an intrusion implicated significant aspects of per-
6. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7. See id. at 27-28.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id.
10. Along with Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), Terry originated the use
of a balancing test. See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in As-
sessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483, 544-49, 584-624
(1995) (discussing origins and utilization of a balancing test by the Court). That test has been
often criticized. See, e.g., Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing
the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383 (1988); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth
Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales through the Least Intrusive Alterna-
tive Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173,1184-94 (1988).
11. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
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sonal security: the "inestimable right of personal security belongs as
much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner clos-
eted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs., 12 Indeed, the Court
said: "'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every person to the possession and con-
trol of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.""..3 The question in
the case before it, the Court asserted, was whether the person's "right to
personal security was violated" by the on-the-street encounter.'4  Fo-
cusing specifically on the protective search that may occur during an in-
vestigatory stop, the Court viewed it as "a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment"'5 and that such an intrusion is an "annoying, fright-
ening, and perhaps humiliating experience.,
16
On the other hand, the Court recognized that the governmental in-
terests were more than just investigating crime; "[i]n addition, there is
the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to as-
sure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him."'7 The
Court posited that "it would be unreasonable to require that police offi-
12. Id. at 8-9.
13. Id. (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). See also id.
at 17 (referring to a stop and frisk as a "serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person").
Recent Supreme Court pronouncements on when a stop occurs have significantly undermined
this right of personal security. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Sei-
zure Analysis After Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799 (1991) (analyzing Su-
preme Court precedent and asserting that the Court's definition of a seizure fails to strike the
proper balance between the competing interests of law enforcement and individual security);
Thomas K. Clancy, The Supreme Court's Search for a Definition of a Seizure: What is a "Sei-
zure" of a Person Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 619
(1990) (defining a seizure as an attempted acquisition of control over a person). See also
Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the
Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1260-64 (1990) (stressing the importance of freedom of
movement and concluding that "[t]he Constitution mandates that the citizenry is beyond the
reach of state intrusion unless the government has good reason to believe that a crime has
been or is being committed").
14. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment
Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 348 (1998) (con-
trasting the Terry Court's emphasis on labeling the person's right as the right to be secure
with the Court's typical labeling of the person's protected interest as being the right to pri-
vacy).
15. 392 U.S. at 17.
16. Id. at 25.
17. Id. at 23.
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cers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties."'8 It
pointed to the'long tradition of American criminals use of armed vio-
lence and observed that "every year in this country many law enforce-
ment officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are
wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the
injuries are inflicted with guns and knives."19 Accordingly, the Court
believed it would be "clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power
to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact
carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.'2°
The Court then departed from the probable cause standard to meas-
ure the propriety of a search and seizure2' and adopted a new standard
to measure the propriety of a protective search: it is justified when an
officer has articulable suspicion that the person detained is armed and
dangerous." The Court believed that the manner in which a search is
18. Id.
19. Id. at 23-24. Since Terry was decided, the number of police officers killed annually in
the line of duty has tripled and the numbers of those assaulted and wounded have risen by a
factor of twenty. See United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 829 (1994). See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, -, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1997)
(noting that "traffic stops may be dangerous encounters" and that "[i]n 1994 alone, there
were 5,762 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops").
20. 392 U.S. at 24.
21. See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 3, at 53-56 (discussing the Terry Court's rejection of the
probable cause standard).
22. Discussing the concept of articulable suspicion in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 7 (1989), the Court stated:
The officer, of course, must be able to articulate something more than suspicion or
"hunch." [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)]. The Fourth Amendment requires
"some minimal level of objective justification" for making the stop. INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984). That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of
wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause
means "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,"
United States v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 218 (1983), and the level of suspicion required
for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause. See
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541,544 (1985).
See also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-96 (1996) (discussing the concept of ar-
ticulable suspicion). All of the factors justifying a Terry stop and a protective search, exam-
ined separately, can be "quite consistent" with innocent behavior but, when examined to-
gether, can still "amount to reasonable suspicion." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9. The amount of
information available to the officer at the time need not be great. See, e.g., id. Indeed, in
Terry, the officer only observed the suspects pacing back and forth in front of a store for a
period of time, conferring, and looking into the store's windows. The officer was an experi-
enced veteran and that experience provided meaning to the men's actions: he believed that
criminal activity, that is, a plan to rob the store, was afoot. His stop and frisk of the men was
therefore upheld. See 392 U.S. at 5-7,27-28.
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conducted is just "as vital a part of the inquiry" as whether it is war-
ranted at all. Although the Court did "not develop at length... the
limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective sei-
zure and search for weapons," 24 the Court believed that it must be "con-
fined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer."' Each case, the Terry Court believed, must be evaluated based
on the particular circumstances presented.2 The limitations of a protec-
tive search, the Court emphasized, "will have to be developed in the
concrete factual circumstances of individual cases."''
Applying those principles to the facts of Terry, the Court saw "no se-
rious problem" in the scope of the search:
Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of petitioner
and his two companions. He did not place his hands in their
pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had
felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the
guns. He never did invade Katz's person beyond the outer sur-
faces of his clothes, since he discovered nothing in his pat-down
which might have been a weapon. Officer McFadden confined
his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn
whether the men were armed and to disarm them once he dis-
covered the weapons. He did not conduct a general exploratory
search for whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find.
Three aspects of Terry that have generated controversy and confu-
sion are important to the present discussion. The first is the ambiguity
concerning whether the Court was approving of a mere pat-down or
something else. One reading is that the Court was limiting the search to
only a pat-down.29 Another reading of the Court's language regarding
the scope of a protective search is that Terry's references to a pat-down
were merely descriptive, not limiting.30 It was mere happenstance that
the protective actions of Officer McFadden in Terry were restricted to a
pat-down and the Court repeatedly asserted that each case must be de-
23. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28.
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 28-29.
27. Id. at 29.
28. Id. at 29-30.
29. See infra note 103 and authorities cited therein.
30. See infra note 110 and authorities cited therein.
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cided on its own facts. The Court was careful not to state that the scope
of the search must be limited invariably to only a pat-down of the outer
clothing. However, in summing up its opinion, the Court, while stress-
ing that "[e]ach case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its
own facts," said that it was holding that an officer is entitled "to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an at-
tempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him."' Even
this language, while far from transparent, did not seem to limit a search
to only a pat-down; instead, the search was to be limited to the outer
clothing, but nothing suggested that the officer had to remain on the sur-
face of the clothing for the search to be proper. Taken as a whole, ac-
cording to this view, Terry seemed to be a factually based analysis of the
case before the Court, with no hard and fast set of rules announced gov-
erning the scope of the permissible intrusion associated with all protec-
tive searches.
Second, Terry was ambiguous regarding any requirement that the of-
ficer employ the least intrusive means in performing the protective
search. A least intrusive means analysis, as developed in other cases,
requires that the police employ the most minimally intrusive search or
seizure that will effectuate the government's goals; if the officer's intru-
sion goes beyond that which is minimally necessary, it violates the
Fourth Amendment.32 Terry spoke of "Officer McFadden confin[ing]
his search strictly to what was minimally necessary to learn whether the
men were armed and to disarm them once he discovered the weapons.
He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence
of criminal activity he might find."3 Some courts and authorities assert
that this language mandates a least intrusive means analysis?4 On the
other hand, this language could be read as simply descriptive of what
McFadden did. Indeed, the Court did not set forth any requirement of a
31. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. See also id. at 15 ("No judicial opinion can comprehend the
protean variety of the street encounter, and we can only judge the facts of the case before
u. ').
32. See infra Part V.A.
33. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
34. See cases cited infra notes 140-41. See also Wayne R. LaFave, Fourth Amendment
Vagaries (of Improbable Cause, Imperceptible Plain View, Notorious Privacy, and Balancing
Askew), 74 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1205 (1983) (interpreting Terry as mandating
a least intrusive means analysis); Strossen, supra note 10, at 1263 n.479 (noting that courts and
commentators have interpreted Terry as requiring a least intrusive means analysis and argu-
ing that Terry at least implicitly supports such an analysis); Sam Kamin, Law and Technology:
The Case for a Smart Gun Detector, 59 W.T.R. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 226 (1996)
(asserting that Terry mandates a least intrusive means requirement for frisks).
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least intrusive means analysis beyond those few words or seek to justify
such a standard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
A third theme emanating from Terry's language is the level of assur-
ance that the officer may obtain that the suspect is armed. Terry spoke
in terms of giving the officers "the power to take necessary measures to
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon,"3 but later
stated that the intrusion must be "reasonably designed to discover guns,
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer."36 If the officer can determine if the person is "in fact" carrying
a weapon, that level of assurance would justify an extensive examination
of the suspect, which seems at odds with an intrusion "reasonably de-
signed" to discover weapons, which implies a lower level of assurance
that the person is not armed.
These three ambiguities in Terry have played out in subsequent Su-
preme Court and lower court decisions. Sibron v. New York,' a com-
panion case to Terry, served to undermine the Terry Court's assertions
that there were no hard and fast rules and that each case must be de-
cided on its own facts. It also added support for the view that a pat-
down defined the limits of a permissible protective search.
An officer confronted Sibron after observing him engaged in a series
of conversations with known narcotics addicts." The officer told Sibron:
"You know what I am after," and Sibron "mumbled something and
reached into his pocket."39 The officer at the same time "thrust his hand
into the same pocket" and discovered several glassine envelopes con-
taining heroin.4 The state did not attempt to justify the search as a pro-
tective one at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence; instead,
the officer testified that he was looking for narcotics.4 '1 The Supreme
Court observed that the officer's testimony presented no "facts from
which he [could have] reasonably inferred that [Sibron] was armed and
dangerous., 42 Nonetheless, the Court "assum[ed] arguendo" that the of-
ficer had sufficient grounds for a search of Sibron for weapons and then
35. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
36. Id. at 29.
37. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Sibron was issued as a joint opinion with Peters v. New York.
Peters involved a search incident to arrest based on probable cause and the limitations of a
protective search were not discussed in that case. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 66-68.
38. See id. at 45.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 46-47 n.4 & 64-65 n.21.
42. Id. at 64.
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found that "the nature and scope of the search conducted by [the offi-
cer] were so clearly unrelated to that justification as to render the heroin
inadmissible." 43 The Court reasoned:
The search for weapons approved in Terry consisted solely of a
limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed
objects which might be used as instruments of assault. Only
when he discovered such objects did the officer in Terry place his
hands in the pockets of the men he searched. In this case, with
no attempt at an initial limited exploration for arms, [the officer]
thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and took from him enve-
lopes of heroin. His testimony shows that he was looking for
narcotics, and he found them. The search was not reasonably
limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which
might conceivably have justified its inception-the protection of
the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man."
One fundamental problem with the Court's analysis in Sibron is that
it was unnecessary to a decision in the case. The state, at the motion to
suppress, never asserted that it was a protective search and the officer's
testimony demonstrated that he was looking for narcotics. The Court's
analysis was therefore ill considered and served merely to confuse what
Terry announced regarding the proper scope of a protective search.45
Moreover, having taken on the issue, the Court's analysis did little to
clarify the principles set forth in Terry. Both Terry and Sibron were
authored by Chief Justice Warren. Although in Terry he was generally
careful to emphasize that the holding of the Court was addressed to the
facts in Terry and that each case had to be decided on its own facts,
Warren broadly opined in Sibron that the "search for weapons ap-
proved in Terry consisted solely of a limited patting of the outer clothing
of the suspect for concealed objects." 6 Was this merely descriptive or
was it designed to limit the scope of all Terry searches? One reading of
43. Id. at 65.
44. Id.
45. Compare Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052 n.16 (1983) (distinguishing Sibron
on the ground that it was not a protective search but rather a search for narcotics), with Long,
463 U.S. at 1060 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (relying on Sibron's language to assert that the
scope of a Terry search "consisted solely of a limited [pat-down] of the outer clothing"). Cf
also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 250 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Si-
bron for proposition that a protective search was limited to patting down outer clothing of
suspect); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (stating that the search in Sibron was
illegal because it was not a protective search but rather a search for narcotics).
46. Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65.
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Terry, where the Court emphasized that it was merely deciding the fac-
tual situation before it and not setting broad rules, would seem to indi-
cate that the language of Sibron was again a mere factual recitation of
the circumstances of Terry. However, the remainder of the language
quoted above from Sibron indicates that the Court was not merely
summarizing the facts of Terry. Warren emphasized that the officer in
Sibron made "no attempt at an initial limited exploration for arms," but
instead "thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and took from him enve-
lopes of heroin."'47 Arguably consistent with a least intrusive analysis
and with the view that the scope of a protective search is limited to a
pat-down, this language seems to indicate that there was some more
limited action the officer should have performed, namely a pat-down.
Yet, if an officer is confronting a suspect that he believes is armed
and dangerous, and the person reaches into a pocket, what could be
more limited that going directly to that pocket and insuring that no
weapon would be coming out of the pocket in the suspect's hand? That
was exactly the point of Justice Black, who dissented in Sibron. Draw-
ing different inferences than the majority from the facts, Black argued
that the officer had probable cause to believe that Sibron had a danger-
ous weapon in his pocket "which he might use if it were not taken away
from him."" Black therefore believed that it was an appropriate re-
sponse to reach into Sibron's pocket.49
III. SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT AUTHORITY
Four subsequent Supreme Court cases discuss the scope of a protec-
tive search. The first, Adams v. Williams, ° concerned an officer who
had information indicating exactly where the weapon might be found.
The officer was tipped by an informant that a suspect seated in a nearby
car was carrying a handgun in his waistband." The officer approached
the vehicle, tapped on the window, and asked the driver to open the
door. Instead, the driver rolled down the window. 2 The officer then
reached in and removed a revolver from the driver's waistband.53 "The
gun had not been visible... from outside the car, but it was in precisely
47. Id.
48. Id. at 80-81 (Black, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
49. See id.
50. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
51. See id. at 144-45.
52. See id. at 145.
53. See id.
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the place indicated by the informant. '
After determining that the information was sufficient to justify an
investigative stop and a protective search,55 the Supreme Court upheld
the officer's action:
When William s rolled down his window, rather than complying
with the policeman's request to step out of the car so that his
movements could more easily be seen, the revolver allegedly at
Williams' waist became an even greater threat. Under these cir-
cumstances the policeman's action in reaching to the spot where
the gun was thought to be hidden constituted a limited intrusion
designed to insure [the officer's] safety.... ."
The Court performed no extended analysis of the scope of the intru-
sion. It did not speak in terms of a preliminary pat-down requirement
or any exceptions to it. Instead, the Court simply stated: "So long as
the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason to believe
that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons
search limited in scope to this protective purpose."'
Williams has also been interpreted in wildly differing ways." Wil-
liams at least dispels any notion that a pat-down of the outer clothing
invariably represents the limits of a protective search or is a preliminary
requirement of all protective searches. Beyond those principles, Wil-
liams lends support to several views regarding the proper scope of a pro-
tective search. For example, some courts view Williams as representing
an exception to a pat-down requirement due to the knowledge of the
exact location of the weapon. Others believe that Williams excused a
pat-down requirement because the officer had reliable information that
Williams had a gun in his waistband and, when the suspect failed "to
comply with the officer's request to exit the car, [the suspect] prevented
the officer from performing a frisk or pat-down without placing himself
54. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,148 (1972).
55. See id. at 145-46.
56. Id. at 148.
57. Id. at 146.
58. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5(b), at 272 (3d ed. 1996)
(itemizing various views of Williams).
59. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 658 So. 2d 620, 620-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), rev.
denied, 666 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1995) (when officer observed bulge on left side of suspect's shirt,
lifting shirt "at exact spot where he observed bulge" permissible as a "limited intrusion" and
"an initial pat down search of the defendant would have been an exercise in futility"); see also
Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 1271,1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (same).
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in a much more dangerous position in relation to the suspect. ' 60
The second decision is Pennsylvania v. Mimms6 decided a few years
after Williams. A police officer observed a bulge in a motorist's jacket
after the motorist had exited his car pursuant to the officer's order dur-
ing a valid traffic stop. The Court left to the reader's imagination what
actions the officer actually performed and stated simply that the officer
"frisked" the man and discovered a revolver.2 The question before the
Supreme Court was whether there was sufficient justification for the in-
trusion and not whether the scope of the intrusion was exceeded. The
Court concluded that the bulge was sufficient to justify a "'pat-down."' ''
Mimms, which otherwise has little relevance to the present discussion on
the scope of a permissible protective search, illustrates the use of the
words "frisk" and "pat-down" to describe a Terry search." Some lower
courts have used those shorthand phrases not as merely descriptive of
what the officer has done, but as terms of limitation as to what an officer
may only do, that is, the officer may only pat down or frisk.65
A third case, the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Long,6
while itself not free from ambiguity, seemed to reject a least intrusive
means requirement and adds support to the view that the scope of a
frisk is not inflexibly limited to an external pat-down of the person's
clothing in all situations. The Long Court extended the permissible
scope of a Terry search to include areas beyond the person.' Specifi-
cally, the Court expanded such searches to include the passenger com-
partment of a vehicle in which the detained person is seated or from
which that person has alighted,' reiterating Terry's language that the
scope must be developed in the "concrete factual circumstances" of each
60. Commonwealth v. Cavalieri, 485 A.2d 790, 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). See also State
v. Smith, 693 A.2d 749, 751-52 (Md. 1997); State v. Smith, 689 N.E.2d 598, 599-600 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996). Accord 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 9.5(b), at 272 (3d ed. 1996).
61. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
62. Id at 107.
63. Id. at 112.
64. See, e.g., Knowles v. Iowa, 119 S. Ct. 484, 488 (1998) (referring to Terry as permitting
a "pat-down"); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (referring to Terry as authorizing a
"limited pat-down" for weapons); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (under the Terry
"doctrine a law enforcement officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a pat-
down to find weapons").
65. See infra notes 103 and authorities cited therein.
66. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
67. Id. at 1034-35. See also Buie, 494 U.S. at 332-36 (relying on Terry and Long to per-
mit a protective sweep of a house by police officers when they have articulable suspicion that
the area swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those at the scene of an arrest).
68. 463 U.S. at 1035.
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case.
69
The police in Long investigated a person whom they suspected of
drunk driving. Long's car was in a ditch on the side of the road and the
driver, Long, was outside of his car when the police arrived.70 When
asked for his vehicle registration, Long began to walk back to the open
driver's door of the car' "The officers followed Long and both ob-
served a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver's side of the
car."97 The officers stopped Long and "subjected him to a Terry protec-
tive pat-down, which revealed no weapons." 73 One of the officers then
shined a light into the car to search for weapons and observed some-
thing protruding from the armrest on the front seat.74 After the officer
knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest, he observed an open leather
pouch containing marijuana.75
Rejecting the claim that the scope of a permissible Terry search was
limited to the person, the Court stated:
Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent pat-down
search of a person, we were careful to note that "[w]e need not
develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the
Fourth Amendment places upon a protective search and seizure
for weapons. These limitations will have to be developed in the
concrete factual circumstances of individual cases." Contrary to
Long's view, Terry need not be read as restricting the preventa-
tive search to the person of the detained suspect.
76
The Long Court also asserted that Terry authorized the frisking of
the overcoat worn by Terry because those were the facts of the case.'
The Court thereafter defined the scope of a permissible Terry search of
a vehicle to include those areas of a passenger compartment "in which a
weapon may be placed or hidden."' It therefore upheld the search of
69. Id. at 1047.
70. See id. at 1035-36.
71. See id. at 1036.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1047 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 29) (citations omitted).
77. See id. at 1047 n.12, (quoting People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866, 871 (Mich. 1982)
(Coleman, J., dissenting)). The Court added that the principles stated in Terry would still
control if the overcoat had been carried rather than worn. See id.
78. Id. at 1049.
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Long's vehicle as a valid protective action by the police:
The subsequent search of the car was restricted to those areas to
which Long would generally have immediate control, and that
could contain a weapon. The trial court determined that the
leather pouch containing the marihuana could have contained a
weapon. It is clear that the intrusion was "strictly circumscribed
by the exigencies which justifi[ed] its initiation."79
The Court rejected arguments by Long regarding the scope of the
search and that an area search is fundamentally inconsistent with the
limited scope of a Terry search. The Court said that Terry searches were
limited in that they had to be justified by articulable suspicion and by
the fact that they are protective in nature.' ° To justify an area search,
the Court opined, "the officer must have an articulable suspicion that
the suspect is potentially dangerous."'" The Court made no allusions to
any preliminary pat-down requirement and did not engage in any least
intrusive analysis.' Instead, it stated that a Terry investigation "at close
range" requires the officer to make a "quick decision as to how to pro-
tect himself and others from possible danger," and that there is no re-
quirement "that officers adopt alternative means to ensure their safety
in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter."" Indeed,
the Court seemed to disavow any least intrusive means analysis: "For
the practical reasons explained in Terry, we have never required the po-
lice to adopt alternative measures to avoid a legitimate Terry-type intru-
sion."' This disavowal could have been more explicit. The question
was not whether the police had to avoid the "Terry-type intrusion" en-
tirely, but whether the intrusion must be limited in scope by adopting
measures designed to be only as intrusive as necessary to effectuate its
goal.'
79. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1049,1050-51 (1983) (citations omitted).
80. See id. at 1049.
81. Id. at 1052-53 n.16.
82. See id. The Court summarily dismissed Sibron by asserting that the "case was a
search for narcotics, and not a search for weapons." Id.
83. Id. at 1052.
84. I& at 1052-53 n.16 (citation omitted). Cf. LaFave, supra note 34, at 1205 (acknowl-
edging that Long rejected any lesser intrusive means analysis but criticizing the decision as
inconsistent with prior cases).
85. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 932 F.2d 1068, 1069-71 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting
Long to permit police to reach inside pair of overalls lying on duffel bag after police observed
outline of gun and rejecting claim that police should have simply removed the overalls from
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Justice Brennan, dissenting, viewed the permissible scope of Terry
searches narrowly, rejecting the majority's view of the scope of a per-
missible protective search. He highlighted Terry's language that the
scope of a permissible frisk was "a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing" of the detained person, as well as Sibron's characterization of
Terry to the same effecty and concluded that it was the permissible limit
of a protective search. He further opined that nothing in Terry author-
ized the police to search a suspect's car, which was a "far cry from a
'frisk' and certainly was not 'limited."' 's Brennan also argued that the
police could have "pursued less intrusive, but equally effective, means of
insuring their safety."89 Thus, for example, he opined that the police
could have detained Long outside the vehicle, asked him where the reg-
istration was, and then retrieved the registration themselves.'
The only other Supreme Court decision on the scope of a Terry
search is Minnesota v. Dickerson.9 In Dickerson, a police officer de-
tected no weapon-like objects during the course of a "pat-down search"
of the front of the suspect's body.9 The frisk did reveal, however, "a
small lump" in the suspect's pocket. After "squeezing, sliding and oth-
erwise manipulating" the lump, the officer concluded that it was crack
cocaine and retrieved it from the pocket.93 Justice White, writing for the
Court, set forth what he described as the principles that had been settled
25 years before in Terry and Sibron:' a police officer "may conduct a
pat-down search 'to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a
weapon;' a "protective search... must be strictly 'limited to that which
is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby;"' and "[i]f the protective search goes be-
yond what is necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no
longer valid under Terry. "95
Although the Court recognized that a police officer may properly
seize "nonthreatening contraband" detected during a Terry frisk, it nev-
suspect's reach during encounter).
86. Long, 463 U.S. at 1056 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
87. See id. at 1060.
88. Id. at 1056.
89. Id. at 1065.
90. See id. at 1065 n.7.
91. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
92 Id. at 369.
93. Id. at 377-78 (quoting State v. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992) (citation
omitted)).
94. See id. at 373.
95. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24,26; Sibron, 392 U.S. at 65-66).
1999]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ertheless found the particular search at issue constitutionally invalid.6
The Court explained that, "[a]lthough the officer was lawfully in a posi-
tion to feel the lump in respondent's pocket, because Terry entitled him
to place his hands upon respondent's jacket," the officer exceeded the
scope of a Terry search after concluding that the object was not a
weapon. 97 The Court went on to adopt the plain feel doctrine, which
permits an officer to seize contraband discovered by the sense of touch
during a valid Terry search.98 As part of its explanation of that doctrine,
the Court discussed the lower court's rejection of the doctrine based on
the lower court's distinguishing between the sense of touch and the
sense of sight, with the lower court believing that touch is more intrusive
to personal privacy than sight and less reliable." Addressing that belief,
the Supreme Court noted:
Terry itself demonstrates that the sense of touch is capable of re-
vealing the nature of an object with sufficient reliability to sup-
port a seizure. The very premise of Terry, after all, is that offi-
cers will be able to detect the presence of weapons through the
sense of touch and Terry upheld precisely such a seizure. Even if
it were true that the sense of touch is generally less reliable than
the sense of sight, that only suggests that officers will less often
be able to justify seizures of unseen contraband.0°
In light of the fact that an officer is permitted to frisk a person, the
Court viewed the lower court's belief that the sense of touch was more
intrusive than the sense of sight to be inapposite."'
IV. THE CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS
The diversity of views regarding the permissible scope of a Terry in-
trusion in the 30 years since Terry was decided, and in light of subse-
quent Supreme Court precedent, defies precise categorization. Some
generalizations, however, can be discerned. Because an external pat-
down of a suspect's clothing is the action performed in the overwhelm-
ing number of frisks and was in fact the action taken by Officer McFad-
den in Terry, courts have often used the terms "frisk" or "pat-down" as
96. Id. at 373-75,377-80.
97. Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
9& See id. at 374-75.
99. See id. at 376.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 377.
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shorthand to describe a Terry protective search. For example, one court
has stated that, in Terry, the Supreme Court "held that if the articulable
facts... support an objectively reasonable suspicion that the person...
is armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a carefully limited
search of the outer clothing of [the person lawfully stopped] in an at-
tempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault the officer."'"
Indeed, some courts make the prototypical protective search the only
permissible action that the police may take, that is, Terry searches are
limited to pat-downs, with an intrusion underneath the surface permit-
ted only if something that could be a weapon is detected during the pat-
down."°0
Other courts have avoided the rigidity of that rule when the officer
102. Derricott v. State, 611 A.2d 592,595 (Md. 1992). See also In re SJ., 713 A.2d 45, 48
(Pa. 1998) (Terry search described as pat-down of outer garments for weapons).
103. See, e.g., Warren v. State, __ S.E.2d _, 1998 WL 678091, at *7 (Ala. Crim. App.
1998) ("Generally, Terry limits the permissible scope of a protective pat-down to 'a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing' of a suspect"); Parker v. State, 697 N.E2d 1265, 1267
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Terry for proposition that officer "may perform a carefully lim-
ited pat-down of the outer clothing of the suspect"); State v. Smith, 693 A.2d 749, 751 (Md.
1997) (protective search is, in most instances, limited to a pat-down of the outer surface of the
suspect's clothing); State v. Newton, 489 S.E.2d 147, 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (Terry pat-down
is generally "two-step process" with "pat down first" followed by an intrusion beneath the
surface only if something feels like a weapon); Hodges v. State, 667 So. 2d 145, 147-48 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1995), rev'd, 678 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. 1996); State v. Crook, 485 N.W.2d 726, 729
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (search permitted in Terry limited to pat of outer areas of a person's
clothing unless an object thought to be a weapon is felt); State v. Andrews, 565 N.E.2d 1271,
1274 (Ohio 1991) (protective search approved of in Terry limited to pat-down), cert. denied,
501 U.S. 1220 (1991); Alfred v. State, 487 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) ("only a
pat-down of the exterior of the clothing surface is permitted"); People v. Superior Court, 94
Cal. Rptr. 728,730-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (reviewing California decisions); People v. Collins,
463 P.2d 403, 406 (Cal. 1970) (en banc) (limiting search to pat-down of exterior of suspect's
clothing); Shaver v. State, 963 S.W.2d 598,602-04 (Ark. 1998) (Newbern, J., dissenting) (citing
court rule limiting frisk to outer clothing of person detained and immediate surrounding and
collecting cases in accord). See also GEORGE DERY III, Remote Frisking Down to the Skin:
Government Searching Technology Powerful Enough to Locate Holes in Fourth Amendment
Fundamentals, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 387 (1997) ("the scope of any frisk was explicitly
restricted to a pat down of the outer clothing" by the Terry Court); David A. Harris, Frisking
Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1, 12 (1994) (Terry frisk "lim-
ited in scope to a pat-down of the outer clothing"). Professor LaFave initially interpreted
Terry as limiting a protective search to a pat-down but has acknowledged that later cases do
not impose such a limitation. Compare LaFave, supra note 3, at 88 ("Terry indicates that a
two-step process must ordinarily be followed. the officer must pat down first and then in-
trude beneath the surface only if he comes upon something which feels like a weapon"), with
4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 9.5(b), at 271-73 (3d ed. 1996) (interpreting Supreme Court
precedent to mean that an external patting of a person's clothing is not initially required when
conducting a protective search but arguing that such a pat-down should be required, with ex-
ceptions for situations where "it would be foolhardy for the officer to do anything short of an
immediate search").
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has specific knowledge of the location of the weapon. 4 For example, in
Commonwealth v. Houser,'°5 the court upheld a police officer reaching
into the jacket pocket of a suspect based on the officer's observation of
the outline of a gun. The court stated that "a police officer may search
directly for the weapon when he has reason to believe that it is on a cer-
tain part of the individual's body."1 6 The court reasoned:
To require a police officer to frisk an individual when he already
has reason to believe that a handgun is in a certain location on
the suspect's body would only increase the risk of harm to the of-
ficer. Furthermore, a search limited to the area where the
weapon is believed to be is in our view most reasonable under
the circumstances."
Other courts dispense with the pat-down requirement when the sus-
pect's actions make the frisk more difficult"~ or the situation more dan-
gerous."9
104. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)
(when responding to call of shots fired, permissible to reach directly into pocket of defendant
after observing him reach into pocket upon approach of police and noting that, to require a
preliminary pat-down, "would be contrary to every dictate of reason"); People v. Taggart, 229
N.E.2d 581, 586 (N.Y. 1967), appeal dismissed, 392 U.S. 667 (1968) (when officer acted on
anonymous tip that suspect had gun in left hand jacket pocket, reasonable for officer to reach
into pocket without preparatory frisk of exterior of clothing). See also cases cited supra note
59. Cf. State v. Escobales, 547 A.2d 553, 554-55 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988), cer denied, 552 A.2d
434 (Conn. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023 (1989) (upholding reaching into shirt during traf-
fic stop after officers observed suspect stuff something into his pants under his shirt, which
one of the officers believed was a gun; the court reasoned that the officer "knew from her ob-
servation precisely where the defendant had concealed the bulky object. The ultimate ques-
tion in fourth amendment cases is: Was the police officer's response to the given situation
reasonable? In this case, [Officer] Lula had reason to suspect, on the basis of her direct ob-
servations, that the defendant had just concealed a weapon.").
105. 364 A.2d 459,460-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976).
106. Id. at 460.
107. Id. at 461.
108. See, e.g., People v. Whitehead, 522 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). See
also 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 9.5(b), at 272-73 (3d ed. 1996) (advocating rule that pat-
down is required but allowing exception where the suspect makes the pat-down ineffective or
more dangerous).
109. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 693 A.2d 749,751-52 (Md. 1997); People v. Casias, 563 P.2d
926, 933-34 (Colo. 1977) (en banc) (while pat-down of exterior of clothing usually required,
directly reaching into pocket upheld in response to suspect's reaching into pocket); Com-
monwealth v. Cavalieri, 485 A.2d 790, 793 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). See also 4 LAFAVE, supra
note 58, § 9.5(b), at 272-73 (3d ed. 1996) (advocating rule that pat-down is required but al-
lowing exception where the suspect makes the pat-down more dangerous); cases cited supra
note 60.
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Still other courts have recognized that the concept of a protective
search is flexible and not restricted to or by an initial pat-down of the
person's clothing.1 Illustrative is United States v. Baker,"' wherein the
court stated:
In finding that Officer Pope was restricted to conducting a pat-
down frisk, the district court erroneously concluded that a pat-
down frisk was the only permissible method of conducting a
Terry search. This reasoning is incorrect because the reason-
ableness of a protective search depends on the factual circum-
stances of each case. Thus, a pat-down frisk is but one example
of how a reasonable protective search may be conducted.'
In Baker, Officer Pope lawfully stopped a car for a traffic violation
and developed articulable suspicion that the driver, Baker, was armed
and dangerous. Pope observed a bulge under Baker's shirt near the
waistband of his pants." Pope ordered Baker to lift his shirt to permit
Pope to observe the concealed object. Baker eventually complied, re-
vealing a handgun tucked into his waistband."4 The Fourth Circuit, in
balancing the officer's interest in self-protection against the resulting in-
trusion on Baker's personal security, concluded that the officer's action
110. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1996) (no pat-down re-
quirement); United States v. Hill, 545 F.2d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (rejecting
the view that Terry limited weapon searches to pat-down searches, saying: "Any limited in-
trusion designed to discover guns, knives, clubs or other instruments of assault are permissi-
ble."); United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 920-22 (4th Cir. 1973) (upholding protective
search of shoulder bag when police had tip that Poms always carried gun in the bag); Hodges
v. State, 678 So. 2d 1049, 1051 (Ala. 1996) (reasonableness of Terry search measured by facts
of each case and pulling up pants leg to determine if weapon in suspect's boot not unreason-
able); Stone v. State, 671 N.E.2d 499, 502-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (while the police officer's
actions "went further than the commonly accepted pat-down of the outer clothing for weap-
ons," request of suspect to remove untied high top athletic shoes not unreasonable); Johnson
v. State, 696 So. 2d 1271, 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting preliminary pat-down as
requirement and permitting reaching under sweater where gun was suspected to be); State v.
Hernandez, 658 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (lifting shirt to disclose what was
causing bulge reasonable), rev. denied, 666 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1995); Moore v. United States, 468
A.2d 1342, 1346 (D.C. 1983) (rejecting requirement of pat-down prior to reaching into pocket
where officer observed bulge); Bromwell v. State, 427 A.2d 884, 891 (Del. 1981) (search of
box reasonable, with the court stating: "To impose an inflexible limit upon a weapons search
of a suspect lawfully detained under suspicion of armed felony to a clothing frisk, regardless
of the attendant circumstances, would ... be unrealistic and unreasonable.").
111. 78 F.3d 135 (4th Cir. 1996).
112. Id. at 138 (citations omitted).
113. See id. at 136.
114. See id.
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was "a reasonable search limited to discovering whether he was carrying
a concealed weapon.' 15 The court reasoned:
Directing that he raise his shirt required little movement by
Baker and allowed Officer Pope to immediately determine
whether Baker was armed without having to come in close con-
tact with him. And, it minimized the risk that he could draw his
weapon before Officer Pope could attempt to neutralize the po-
tential threat. In comparison, complying with this direction in-
volved a limited intrusion upon Baker's personal security. In-
deed, this act was less intrusive than the pat-down frisk
sanctioned in Terry. The officer avoided the "serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person" necessitated by the pat-down
frisk, which requires the officer to "feel with sensitive fingers
every portion of the prisoner's body.' 1 6
One recent Maryland case illustrates the competing and conflicting
rules that the courts have adopted to measure the propriety of the scope
of a search. That case, State v. Smith,"' went through three levels of re-
view and generated five opinions and at least four differing views on the
scope of a permissible Terry search. In Smith, Baltimore City Police Of-
ficer Sean White "responded to a police radio broadcast that a group of
individuals were selling drugs and discharging firearms" at a specified
street corner."' Upon arriving at the scene, Officer White, who was an
expert in the use of handguns by drug traffickers,"9 observed a group of
four to five men disperse, with one of the individuals, later identified as
Smith, placing an object in the back waistband of his pants as he ran."
"Although Officer White was unable to discern the precise nature of the
object," it was established that he reasonably believed that Smith was
sticking a handgun into his waist area.' Thus, White had current direct
observations that reasonably led him to believe that Smith was armed
and dangerous and that the location of the gun was in the back of
Smith's waistband. After detaining Smith, the officer reached directly to
the back of the waistband area and patted down that area but detected
115. Id. at 138.
116. Id. (citations omitted).
117. 693 A.2d 749 (Md. 1997).
118. Id. at 750.
119. See id at 756 (Raker, J., dissenting).
120. See id.
121. Id. at 750, 753 n.1.
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nothing1 2 "White then 'double-checked' his pat-down by pulling
Smith's shirt back to reveal [his] waistband."'1  "At that point, a plastic
bag containing cocaine fell to the ground."' 24
Denying the motion to suppress physical evidence, the motion court
believed that the tugging of the shirt was a limited intrusion designed
solely to "reveal the outline of a gun" and was performed in the back of
the waistband, which was "the normal place to secrete a weapon.""
The Court of Special Appeals, which is Maryland's intermediate appel-
late court, reversed. The majority first asserted that police officers are
restricted to a pat-dowi of a person's outer garments: "'Under the ever-
present minimization requirement of the Fourth Amendment, only a
pat-down of the exterior of the clothing surface is permitted." ' 126 It then
created its own unique exceptions to that rule when
1) after the pat-down begins there is some additional conduct on
the part of the suspect that supports a reasonable belief (even af-
ter the outer garments have been patted-down) that the suspect
is armed with a weapon, or 2) after the frisk is completed, the
police officer has some other reasonable basis to believe that the
suspect is armed and dangerous."
One judge, dissenting, quoted from Terry and Williams extensively,
and asserted that the proper scope of a protective search was not limited
arbitrarily to include only the outer clothing of persons but instead de-
pended on the facts and circumstances of each case."' The dissent ac-
knowledged that the "rule defining the area that may be frisked is not..
. easily stated" '29 but emphasized that the limitations of a protective
search were tied to the "particular facts and circumstances" of each en-
counter m
122. See id. at 750,753; id. at 756 (Raker, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 750.
124. Id.
125. Smith v. State, 666 A.2d 883, 886 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995), affd, 693 A.2d 749
(Md. 1997).
126. Id. at 887 (quoting Alfred v. State, 487 A.2d 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985)). In
reaching this conclusion, the court viewed the search in Terry as "the model for how the po-
lice should conduct" a protective search. Id. at 888 (quoting Anderson v. State, 553 A2d
1296 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)).
127. Id. at 890.
128. See id. at 890-93 (Garrity, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 891-92.
130. Id. at 893. See also id. at 894 ("it is most important to realize clearly that the Su-
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Upon further review to the highest court of Maryland, three of the
seven judges of the Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with the dissent
in the intermediate appellate court.'31 However, a majority of the Court
of Appeals rejected that view. That majority also rejected, in part, the
Court of Special Appeals' framework for assessing the scope of a per-
missible protective search. The Court of Appeals majority established
that an officer must employ the least intrusive method of discovering
and neutralizing any concealed weapons.'3 Accordingly, in "most in-
stances, a pat-down" is all that the police officer may do 33 because, the
court believed, "a pat-down of the outer surface of a suspect's clothing is
typically the least intrusive method" of discovering a weapon.' The
majority allowed, however, that "[u]nder certain conditions, more intru-
sive means of 'frisking' may be justified."' 35 It then detailed as an exam-
ple "the rare instance where a police officer is unable to perform an ef-
fective pat-down.... "" Using the Supreme Court's opinion in Williams
to illustrate, the court characterized the search there as "clearly more
intrusive than a pat-down," but said that it was justified because of "the
suspect's failure to comply with the officer's directive and the resulting
inability of the officer to conduct an effective pat-down."' The major-
ity concluded that, "[u]nder those circumstances, the police officer re-
mained within the bounds of 'what was minimally necessary' to ensure
his protection.', 138 The court also cited other cases where it believed that
"extenuating circumstances placed the officer's safety in such jeopardy
that alternative means of determining whether the suspect was armed
were justified and reasonable."'39
preme Court did not confine a weapons search to mere outer clothing if the circumstances oth-
erwise warranted").
131. See State v. Smith, 693 A.2d 749,755 (Md. 1997) (Raker, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 753.
133. Id. at 751.
134. Id. at 753.
135. Id. at 751.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 751-52. The court rejected the view that Williams authorized "police officers
to dispense with a pat-down merely because they have reason to believe that a weapon is con-
cealed at a particular location on a suspect's person." Id. at 752 (citing 4 LAFAVE, supra note
58, § 9.5(b), at 272 (3d ed. 1996)).
138. Id. at 752.
139. Id.
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V. THE SCOPE OF A PROTECTIVE SEARCH: ELIMINATING THE
MISCONCEIVED PAT-DOWN LIMITATION
The concept of a pat-down or frisk is a constant theme running
throughout the caselaw. Supreme Court opinions use the terms repeat-
edly to describe a protective search. The initial cases, Terry and Sibron,
are ambiguous as to whether such actions define the permissible limits
of a search. However, Williams and Long suggest that there is no such
limitation. More current cases simply shed no light on the issue. How-
ever, numerous lower courts and commentators assert that there is a
pat-down requirement. A pat-down requirement seems to be justified
principally by reference to another requirement, that is, that an officer
must employ the least intrusive means to effectuate the search. Profes-
sor LaFave provides another justification, that is, that a pat-down re-
quirement serves to deter false police testimony. A third possible justi-
fication is that a pat-down creates a convenient bright-line rule. These
three justifications for a pat-down limitation on protective searches are
examined in this part.
A. Least Intrusive Means Analysis
The lower courts are hopelessly split on the question of whether a
least intrusive means analysis is an element that should be applied in as-
sessing the reasonableness of the scope of a protective search. Many
lower courts continue to look to the availability of less intrusive alterna-
tives in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure,'O including
140. See, e.g., Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding
blood test unreasonable based on availability of breath and urine tests to ascertain if driving
while intoxicated); F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (inquiring "whether
the state could have achieved its objectives in a less intrusive manner and finding that dis-
semination of patients' records was proper"); Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040, 1046 (7th
Cir. 1995) (using less intrusive means analysis to conclude that a more intrusive search of mi-
nor offender was necessary based on facts); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 396-97 (10th
Cir. 1993) (strip search in jail of minor offender unreasonable because of availability of pat-
down search); United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (analyz-
ing agent's actions while interrogating occupants of vehicle stopped at checkpoint to establish
that they were "no more intrusive than necessary"), cert denied, 506 U.S. 898 (1992); Baugh-
man v. State, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (stating rule in invasion of privacy
action); Estes v. Rowland, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901, 904-05, 909-10, 920 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (ap-
plying less intrusive means analysis to searches of prison visitors); State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d
1204, 1205-26 (Me. 1990) (stating rule in context of vehicle safety roadblocks), cert denied,
500 U.S. 941 (1991); Barreras v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 838 P.2d 983, 987 (N.M.
1992) (applying less intrusive means analysis to canine searches of correctional officers); State
v. Garcia, 860 P.2d 217,219 (N.M. App. 1993) (applying less intrusive means analysis to strip
search of prison visitors and finding that permitting visitor to depart from prison was required
alternative). See also Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1368 (9th
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when assessing the reasonableness of an investigative stop 141 and frisk. 42
This is despite what seems to be a clear mandate from the Supreme
Court in more recent cases that a least intrusive means analysis is not an
element of reasonableness.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court's initial pronounce-
ments in Terry and Sibron on the propriety of such an analysis are sub-
ject to conflicting interpretations. In many other cases extending well
into the 1980s, the Court embraced the view that the examination of less
intrusive means is a component of reasonableness.' 43 Even in cases
Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (employing less intrusive means analysis of using tear gas
or waiting out suspect to show that storming of suspect's residence was unreasonable), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 735 (1995); 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 10.7(b), at 658 (3d ed. 1996) (argu-
ing for less intrusive means analysis for screening prison visitors); Russell W. Galloway, Jr.
Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 737, 772 n.214 (1992) (avail-
ability of less restrictive alternatives is factor to be considered); Strossen, supra note 10, at
1263 (advocating less intrusive means analysis and asserting that "the initial search for weap-
ons should be limited to a pat-down of the detainee's outer clothing").
141. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Lawson, 122 F.3d 639, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Dixon, 51 F.3d 1376, 1380 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bueno, 21 F.3d 120, 125 (6th Cir.
1994); Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1254 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S.
801 (1994); United States v. Watts, 7 F.3d 122, 127 (8th Cir. 1993) (police must employ least
intrusive means during stop); United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199, 1205-06 (8th Cir. 1992),
vacated on other grounds, 510 U.S. 801 (1993); United States v. Withers, 972 F.2d 837, 843
(7th Cir. 1992); State v. Tierney, 584 N.W.2d 461, 466 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998); Woods v. State,
970 S.W.2d 770,775 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Gruen, 582 N.W.2d 728,733 (Wis. Ct. App.
1998); People v. Soun, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 822, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Hawkins v. United
States, 663 A.2d 1221, 1227-28 (D.C. 1995); State v. Ohlsen, 537 N.W.2d 794, 797-98 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1995); State v. Moreno, 619 So. 2d 62, 66 (La. 1993); State v. Hughes, 899 S.W.2d 92, 99
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Gaines v. State, 888 S.W.2d 504, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Thomas v.
Commonwealth, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (Va. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 444 S.E.2d
275 (Va. App. Ct. 1994) (en bane).
142. See, e.g., Woods v. State, 970 S.W.2d 770, 775-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); State v.
Smith, 693 A.2d 749 (Md. 1997); Reynolds v. State, 592 So. 2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1992); In re
Marrhonda G., 575 N.Y.S.2d 425,428 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1991); Worthey v. State, 805 S.W.2d 435,
439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
143. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106,118-19 (1986) (finding that the officer's actions
of moving papers on car's dash was "no more intrusive than necessary" to locate VIN and
stating that the officer cannot enter the passenger compartment if the VIN is visible from out-
side the vehicle); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1985) (rejecting unrealistic
judicial second guessing as to existence of less intrusive means but stating: "The question is
not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unrea-
sonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it."); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1985)
(discussing surgical intrusions into a person's body for evidence and citing Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), as an example of a search that was "not more intrusive than rea-
sonably necessary to accomplish its goals"); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plu-
rality opinion) ("the investigative methods employed [during a Terry stop) should be the least
intrusive means reasonably available"); id, at 511 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that
the availability of less intrusive means may make an otherwise reasonable intrusion unrea-
sonable but adding, because a lawful stop must be strictly limited, "it is difficult to conceive of
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seemingly rejecting a least intrusive means analysis, the Court nonethe-
less used such an analysis.'" Nonetheless, the Court seemed to reject
such analysis in Long as to protective searches, although that opinion is
not without some ambiguity. However, in many other cases and par-
ticularly in more recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly de-
clared that a less intrusive means analysis is not an element of reason-
ableness: "We have repeatedly refused to declare that only the 'least
intrusive' search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment."'1 45 The Supreme Court has stated that it has rejected the
analysis because "elaborate less-restrictive-alternative arguments could
raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-and-
seizure powers."1" Moreover, no part of the balancing test currently
utilized by the Supreme Court suggests that a least intrusive means
analysis should be employed. The Court merely balances the need to
search against the invasion that the search entails."
a less intrusive means that would be effective to accomplish the purpose of the stop"); Dela-
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1979) (rejecting use of spot checks of drivers' licenses
and vehicular registrations at the discretion of the officer in the field in part because of the
availability of alternative mechanisms); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883-87
(1975) (declining to permit roving patrols by immigration authorities to engage in suspicion-
less stops and requiring articulable suspicion for stop, the latter allowing "the Government
adequate means of guarding the public interest"); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318-24
(1971) (receipt of benefits for dependent children permissibly tied to a home visit by govern-
mental authorities because home visit provided information that could not be obtained
through interview anywhere else); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 56-58 (1967) (comment-
ing on limitations placed on wiretap device used in Osborn v. New York, 385 U.S. 323 (1966),
as involving no greater invasion of privacy "than was necessary under the circumstances");
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (area-wide health and safety code in-
spections reasonable because other canvassing techniques would not achieve acceptable re-
sults).
144. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 529 (1979) (noting that less intrusive means
analysis is not required but also assuming that it is and concluding that hypothesized alterna-
tive was not as effective); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 & n.12
(1976) (although stating that less restrictive alternative arguments could raise insuperable
barriers to the exercise of search and seizure powers, also rejecting the suggested alternative
and adding that the traffic-checking program in the interior was "necessary" because the flow
of illegal immigrants could not be controlled effectively at the international border).
145. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995). Accord Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,453-54 (1990); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
1, 10-11 (1989); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989);
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1987); United States v. Montoya De Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1985); Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1983); Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433,447 (1973).
146. Vernonia School District, 515 U.S. at 664 n.3 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559 nA0 (1979)), which in turn quoted United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-557
n.12 (1976)).
147. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1046 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21
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More fundamentally, one need not subscribe to the propriety of the
Court's balancing test in order to reject a least intrusive means analy-
sis." There is no support for such an analysis in the language of the
amendment or in the historical regulation of search and seizure pow-
ers. 49 A least intrusive means analysis first appeared in opinions during
the Warren Court era,-'° and the advocates of such an analysis do not
rely on historical precedent to support it. Rather, they argue that it is
necessary to achieve equivalence of protection between Fourth
Amendment rights and other guarantees of the Bill of Rights.'5' For ex-
ample, one commentator has argued that "the rationale which is com-
monly offered for according a special status to first amendment liber-
ties-that they created the environment necessary for other freedoms to
flourish-is equally applicable to the fourth amendment."'" Such broad
brush analysis ignores important historical differences in constitutional
rights and the language of the constitution. For example, the First
Amendment's Speech Clause utilizes absolute language: "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech."'53 Given that
absolute bar,14 as a general matter,5 it is appropriate that restrictions on
(1968). See also Clancy, supra note 10, at 584-624 (discussing the elements of the balancing
test employed by the Court).
148. See supra note 10 and authorities cited therein.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski,
J., concurring) (finding no support for a least intrusive means requirement in either the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment or in the "two centuries of search and seizure caselaw" in-
terpreting it), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1005 (1992).
150. See supra note 143 and authorities cited therein.
151. See Strossen, supra note 10, at 1242 ("Because fourth amendment rights are 'second
to none' in importance, governmental actions which intrude upon them should be subject to
at least one aspect of the scrutiny applied to infringements of other Bill of Rights freedoms.
The Court's refusal to insist that the government conduct searches and seizures pursuant to
the least intrusive alternative measure that would still substantially promote state goals rele-
gates fourth amendment freedoms to a second class status in comparison to other constitu-
tional rights."); Sundby, supra note 10, at 436-37 (arguing that a strict scrutiny-least intrusive
means standard would "bestow preferred status upon the fourth amendment as a fundamen-
tal right").
152. Strossen, supra note 10, at 1241 (footnote omitted).
153. U.S. CONST., amend. I (emphasis added).
154. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 792-94 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing
the recurring debate in First Amendment jurisprudence whether such rights are absolute in
the sense that the government may not abridge them at all or whether the amendment re-
quires a balancing of interests).
155. It is, of course, well established that not all restrictions on speech warrant strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (discussing stan-
dards for regulation of commercial speech). This article examines First Amendment juris-
prudence only to the extent necessary to contrast its language with that of the Fourth
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speech should be subjected to a requirement of necessity, that is, that
the government have a compelling interest and that the restriction be
narrowly tailored to effectuate that interestus Such close tailoring
analysis is, however, inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context.
The Fourth Amendment, instead of barring governmental intrusions,
requires only that the intrusion be reasonable. This is to say that rea-
sonableness is a more forgiving concept than a least intrusive means
analysis allows. In accordance with that reasonableness mandate, the
means need be only reasonably related to the justification for the intru-
sion.'
Such an analysis is also unfair to police officers. Officers on the
street confronting potentially armed and dangerous suspects are re-
quired to made a "quick decision" as to how to protect themselves.1 58 To
subject their measurement of what is needed to protect themselves to
post hoc second guessing to scrutinize whether they engaged in the least
intrusive means of effecting the goal of the intrusion places an unrealis-
tic and dangerous burden on police officers. 5 9 It is unrealistic because it
requires them to "exercise superhuman judgment" in always choosing
the least intrusive means of accomplishing the goal, and it is dangerous
Amendment in order to establish the proposition that the two rights are so different that the
standards to judge intrusions on those rights must reflect those differences.
156. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(regulations that discriminate among instances of speech based on its content are valid only if
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and are narrowly drawn to that end).
157. See State v. Vasquez, 807 P.2d 520, 523 (Ariz. 1991) ("we do not require an officer
to be all-knowing, only to be prudent and reasonable"). The availability of alternatives may
be a consideration in assessing whether the means employed are reasonably related to the
intrusion but such an analysis is but one factor in assessing reasonableness. See Clancy, supra
note 10, at 601-24. Cf. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1562-63 (10th Cir. 1993) ("While
police officers are not required to use the least intrusive means in the course of [an investiga-
tive stop], we must determine whether [the officer's] failure to use less intrusive means was
unreasonable."); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Dangerous Misconceptions: Protecting Police Officers,
Society, and the Fourth Amendment's Right to Personal Security, 22 HASTINGS CONsT. L. Q.
623, 696 (1995) (scrutiny of means does not "necessarily require identifying the least intrusive
practice" but instead "entails consideration of whether the police practice was reasonable in
light of available alternatives").
158. Long, 463 U.S. at 1052 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28).
159. See, e.g., Vasquez, 807 P.2d at 524 ("[n]or will we condemn an officer's reach into
pockets merely because, in retrospect, it may appear that another course may have been
available"); Bailey v. United States, 279 A.2d 508,510 (D.C. 1971) ("the tactical choice by the
police between apparent alternative courses of action cannot be overturned by detached judi-
cial deliberation as long as the course of action taken is in itself reasonable"). See also Smith
v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 504 U.S. 915 (1992) ("We must
never allow the theoretical, sanitized world of our imagination to replace the dangerous and
complex world that policemen face every day.").
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because it "would inevitably induce tentativeness by officers, and thus
deter police from protecting the public and themselves."''6 It is also in-
consistent with the view that deference should be given to the experi-
ence of police officers in assessing the reasonableness of their actions."'
For example, in State v. Vasquez," officers confronted Vasquez in a
parking lot arguing with his wife in the early morning hours in March,
and the police had reasonable suspicion to believe that he was danger-
ous. After the police decided to take him home rather than arrest him,
Vasquez stated that he was cold and indicated that he wanted a nearby
jacket.' An officer picked up the jacket, which was bulky and had large
pockets; he patted it down but could not ascertain if it contained any
weapons.64 The officer then reached into the pockets to check for
weapons and discovered cocaine."' The Arizona Supreme Court di-
vided over the reasonableness of the officer's actions. The majority re-
jected any least intrusive means analysis and believed that, because the
officer had "the right to conduct a pat-down search of the jacket, the of-
ficer had the right to make the search effective" by reaching into the
pocket.6" The dissent, however, asserted that, because the officers
"could have protected themselves by not offering to give the jacket to
[the] defendant," the search was unreasonable.67 Is it less intrusive and
hence more reasonable to permit the suspect to suffer from the cold by
refusing to give him his jacket or more reasonable to reach into a pocket
before potentially arming him? This is but one of the myriad of situa-
160. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994). Accord Mathieu v. Imperial Toy
Corp., 646 So. 2d 318,325-26 n.12 (La. 1995).
161. The Supreme Court has recently cautioned that reviewing courts should give defer-
ence both to a trial court's and to police officers' inferences drawn from the facts surrounding
an encounter:
A trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features
and events of the community; likewise a police officer views the facts through the
lens of his police experience and expertise. The background facts provide a context
for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve defer-
ence.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996). See also State v. Escobales, 547 A.2d 553,
555 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988), cert. denied, 552 A.2d 434 (Conn. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023
(1989) (extending deference to police's assessment of circumstances).
162. 807 P.2d 520 (Ariz. 1991).
163. See id. at 521.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 524.
167. Id. at 525 (Feldman, J., dissenting).
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tions that police officers are faced with each day. To impose a least in-
trusive means analysis would produce an increasingly complex-and
unworkable-set of rules for each of these situations. Should a court
create a rule to govern such a situation by announcing that the search
was unreasonable because the officer should have instead denied access
to the coat? What if the locale was Alaska in the midst of a blizzard?
Or Florida in the rain? What if the man was alone or if no one would
take responsibility for the coat? Why not just put him in the police car
and turn on the heat? But what if the police car's heater was broken?
Each minor change in the facts seems to change what might be the least
intrusive means that the police could employ and the conclusion one
reaches as to what is the least intrusive may be primarily subjective."
Moreover, in the context of protective searches, such an analysis is
unworkable for another reason. The analysis seems to be premised on
the view that a pat-down is always the least intrusive means. But when a
police officer has information that the weapon is in a specific spot, such
as in Williams, it cannot be said that a pat-down of the entire body is less
intrusive than simply going directly to the spot where the object is and
determining if it is, in fact, a weapon.169 Indeed, there may be no need
for the officer to touch the person at allY. For example, the officer
could simply order the person to raise his shirt to expose the bulge.'
Also, to require a pat-down exposes the officer to unnecessary danger
during the close encounter of a pat-down until he has examined the spot
where the suspected weapon is located. Finally, modem technological
devices are now becoming increasingly available, permitting officers to
locate metallic and hard objects without touching the person.72 Should
168. Cf. Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994) (least intrusive means analysis
is "an inherently subjective determination").
169. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 658 So. 2d 620, 620-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995), rev.
denied, 666 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 1995) (when officer observed bulge on left side of suspect's shirt,
lifting shirt "at the exact spot where he observed a bulge" permissible as a "limited intrusion"
and "an initial pat down search of the defendant would have been an exercise of futility").
170. Cf. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 374-77 (discussing relative intrusiveness
and reliability of the sense of touch and sense of sight and finding inapposite lower court's
view that the touch is more intrusive to privacy than sight because Terry authorizes an officer
to touch a person); John A. Cecere, Note, Searches Woven from Terry Cloth: How the Plain
Feel Doctrine Plus Terry Equals Pretextual Search, 36 B.C. L. REv. 125, 153-54 (1994) (argu-
ing that the "physical touching of an individual represents an extreme invasion of privacy").
171. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 135,138 (4th Cir. 1996).
172. See generally George Dery III, Remote Frisking Down to the Skin Government
Searching Technology Powerful Enough to Locate Holes in Fourth Amendment Fundamen-
tals, 30 CREIGHToN L. REv. 353, 357 (1997) (discussing operational prototypes of technology
that permit "remote frisking" using hand-held or vehicle-mounted devices that "could be
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such devices be mandated in lieu of a pat-down? Yet, "[i]n every Fourth
Amendment decision, a citizen's privacy interest could have been more
fully protected had the state adopted a more expensive alternative.
'' a
Based on the foregoing, a least intrusive means analysis in the con-
text of protective searches should be rejected. Such an analysis has no
support in the history or text of the amendment. It is unfair to police of-
ficers who must make a quick decision how to protect themselves, and
the analysis is unworkable and often illogical to the extent that it is
premised on a pat-down search being the least intrusive means to ascer-
tain that a suspect is armed. The question should be whether the offi-
cer's actions were reasonable, based on the totality of the circumstances.
Reasonableness contemplates that, of a range of options available to an
officer, several options may be acceptable and the mere fact that the of-
ficer has not chosen the most minimally intrusive option does not a for-
tiori invalidate the officer's actions. In assessing whether the police offi-
cer's actions were unduly intrusive, the scope of the search must be
measured by such considerations as the state of the officer's knowledge
at the time as to the type of weapon suspected to be possessed, any in-
formation as to the location of the weapon, and the ease of ascertaining
whether the person is armed or whether there are any barriers to a
used for visual 'pat downs' for weapons on suspicious persons"); David A. Harris, Superman's
X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1996) (discussing how private companies and a government laboratory are design-
ing devices "that will allow police officers to 'see' through clothing to detect whether a person
is carrying a concealed weapon" and noting that two of the designs "would let an officer per-
form the functional equivalent of a frisk... without having to approach or touch the per-
son"). Cf. id. at 43 ("The only certainty regarding technology is that it will keep changing and
improving, almost inexorably, no matter what we do. It will become even less intrusive than
gun detectors (if that is possible), and even more discriminating than a trained canine nose.").
Thus, Professor Harris argues:
The use of gun detectors might also advance interests of the suspect that a Terry
frisk could not: a person who has no weapon need not experience a traditional pat-
down in which the officer assumes physical control of the person and places her
hands on him. With an electronic frisk, there is no need for the suspect to assume
the usual subservient position, often in public, with arms and legs spread apart and
hands up against a wall or squad car. Additionally, items under clothing or in pock-
ets that are not weapons need not be exposed, touched, or explained in any way, as
might be the case in a manual pat-down.
Id. at 53-54.
173. Gadson v. State, 668 A.2d 22, 33 (Md. 1995) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1704 (1996) (arguing that what must be done is to "balance the
means actually chosen to protect the state's interest against the privacy interest asserted by
the defendant").
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search. However, as will be discussed, the most fundamental considera-
tion is the level of assurance a police officer may obtain that the person
he or she is confronting is not armed.
B. Police Perjury
Professor LaFave asserts that a "major virtue of the two-step re-
quirement" of a pat-down and then an intrusion underneath the surface
of the clothing only if the officer detects something that may be a
weapon during the pat-down
is that the officer will not be able to justify an intrusion beneath
the surface of the suspect's clothing without first showing that he
felt a hard object, a matter which often could be subject to later
verification by showing that there was such an object. But if a
beneath-the-surface search may in some circumstances be made
without a patting down, courts will be confronted with the diffi-
cult task of determining, on the basis of conflicting testimony,
whether those circumstances were present. If incriminating evi-
dence is found, it is understandable that many suspects would
claim falsely that those circumstances had not occurred, and it is
less understandable but unfortunately true that some police
would claim falsely that they had occurred."
Certainly, courts must guard against the police's abuse of authority.
Some of the concerns involved in this complex problem are discrimina-
tory treatment of minorities7 ' and false testimony 76 regarding the cir-
cumstances of the encounter. However, those abuses cannot be rectified
by distorting Fourth Amendment principles, which are ill suited to ad-
dress such issues.1" The hampering of all police by crafting limitations
174. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 9.5(b), at 272-73 (footnote omitted).
175. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333,
344-54 (1998) (cataloguing instances of discriminatory enforcement of traffic laws).
176. For recent discussions of the problem of police perjury, see Christopher Slobogin,
Decei4 Pretex4 and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REv. 775 (1997);
Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive
to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 233 (1998); Maclin, supra
note 175, at 379-86. Indeed, it has been recognized that "[p]erhaps the most common form of
police perjury occurs in suppression hearings" to avoid application of the exclusionary rule.
Chin & Wells, supra, at 248.
177. Cf. LaFave, supra note 3, at 59-62 ("it would be harsh medicine indeed to declare
[good faith reasonable investigative stops] unconstitutional in order to administer an indirect
and ineffective slap" at improper practices and adding that new remedies to control abuse
should be developed rather than exclusion of evidence).
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on their authority under the Fourth Amendment is not the solution.
That would lead to more police deaths and injuries. The source of such
problems is bad police officers, not bad principles. Adjusting Fourth
Amendment rules to combat lying would simply lead to more creative
lying. Thus, if the rule is that the police may only engage in a pat-down
of the external clothing of a suspect, such a rule would not prevent a po-
lice officer who refuses to abide by the rule from searching a person's
pockets. It merely prevents one lie ("I felt a hard object"). Police still
have many lies available to them. An officer could avoid the rule by tes-
tifying that the person consented to the search or that the person acted
to prevent an effective pat-down. The solution is to weed out the bad
police and to establish internal police procedures and practices to effec-
tuate that goal.' If a police officer engages in discriminatory treatment,
the proper remedy is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 If there is a concern for false testimony, the courts are
obligated to examine the testimony of police officers carefully"8 and
properly apply the standards to measure the propriety of each protective
search.
178. Cf. People v. Berrios, 270 N.E.2d 709, 714 (N.Y. 1971) (suggesting that police ex-
ecutives and prosecutors deal with the problem of police perjury through departmental disci-
plinary procedures and prosecutorial discretion in selecting witnesses and prosecuting wit-
nesses who testify falsely).
179. Discriminatory treatment of minorities is a complex and persistent problem. The
Terry Court acknowledged that it was a serious concern. 392 U.S. at 14 & 17 n. 14. The
Court, however, ultimately-and properly-concluded that the Fourth Amendment's exclu-
sionary rule was not the proper vehicle to attack such abuses. See id. at 13-15. The Four-
teenth Amendment, not the Fourth, is the proper avenue to attack discrimination. See Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("the constitutional basis for objecting to inten-
tionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment"). But see generally Maclin, supra note 175 (asserting that the Fourth Amend-
ment includes a concern for equal treatment).
180. Cf. Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 603-04 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (rejecting the need
for an cautionary instruction that the testimony of police officers must be viewed with suspi-
cion and observing that the traditional safeguards of the legal system, that is, cross-
examination and a properly instructed jury, suffice to protect against such perjury); Chin &
Wells, supra note 176, at 272-73 (arguing that the jury may be "in the best position to deal
with the problem of police perjury" if "given the right tools" to test credibility). Defense
counsel must also educate courts hearing motions to suppress about what to look for to
evaluate the police testimony. For example, if perjury is common in "dropsy" cases, that is,
false testimony that the officer observed the suspect drop the object, id. at 249, then defense
counsel should be prepared to establish that point and to demonstrate why the police witness
in the case before the court is unworthy of belief. Rules are no substitute for proof. Moreo-
ver, if the problem is that the courts hearing such police testimony uncritically credit the po-
lice, see id. at 264-72, changing Fourth Amendment principles is an ineffective method to ad-
dress lazy or unethical behavior by judges.
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C. Bright-Line Rules
The Supreme Court has utilized bright-line rules in several situations
to guide the police in the performance of searches and seizures.18'
Bright-line rules do not require case-by-case justification of the police
procedure and provide "clear legal boundaries to police conduct."
''
Such rules are premised on the recognition that the protections of the
Fourth Amendment "'can only be realized if the police are acting under
a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a cor-
rect determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interest of law enforcement.""'"
Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by the exclu-
sionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their
day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that
are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law en-
forcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A
highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands,
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hair-
line distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the
facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be
"literally impossible of application by the officer in the field.""6
Accordingly, in some instances, "'[a] single, familiar standard is es-
sential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise
to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in
the specific circumstances they confront..'.. It should be emphasized,
however, that the use of such rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is the exception and not the rule." Reasonableness is typically meas-
ured by the totality of the circumstances and is fact-specific in nature."
A limitation of a protective search to a pat-down of the exterior of
the suspect's clothing has the apparent appeal of a bright-line rule. It is
181. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (permitting police officers to or-
der all passengers to exit a vehicle as an incident of a stop of that vehicle).
182. David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS.
L. REV. 1, 37 (1994).
183. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-
By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
Sup. Cr. REV. 127,142).
184. Id. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, supra note 58, at 183).
185. Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,213-14 (1979)).
186. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,., 117 S. Ct. 417,421 (1996).
187. See id.
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easily stated and arguably, in theory, easily applied. However, the ra-
tionale of such a pat-down rule breaks down upon analysis. With the
Fourth Amendment, factual considerations-not abstract doctrine-
control.1 "Each case involving the reasonableness of a Terry stop and
frisk turns on its own facts."1"9 Police work has become increasingly
more dangerous and to impose a bright-line rule on the police in a
situation where it is a given that they are confronting a person they
reasonably suspect is armed and dangerous and where minor differences
in clothing, articles carried, and other circumstances that vary with each
case, any of which may be of great weight in determining the
appropriateness of a given protective action, demonstrates that such a
rule is inappropriate. It thus imposes an artificial and unrealistic
restriction on their ability to protect themselves.' 9° Also, a pat-down
requirement actually promotes more intrusion than is necessary when
the police know where the object is.
Finally, a pat-down rule is not as bright a line as it may first appear.
Professor LaFave, in his treatise on the Fourth Amendment, asserts that
there is a pat-down requirement and that "recognition of exceptions to
the pat-down requirement should not be undertaken lightly."' 9' He then
acknowledges that "some limited exceptions must be recognized."'9' He
thereafter lists numerous exceptions: the situation in Williams,93 which
he characterizes as justified because "the suspect's failure to respond to
the officer's order to alight from the vehicle made it impossible for the
officer to carry out an effective pat-down or to conduct even a partial
pat-down without putting himself into a much more dangerous position
188. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 29 (the limitations imposed by the Fourth
Amendment "will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual
cases"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,175 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause,.
. . as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act."). But see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (rejecting
claim regarding the practical consequences of warrant as condition of routine felony arrest in
home in absence of any evidence that effective law enforcement had suffered and opining
that "such arguments of policy must give way to a constitutional command that we consider to
be unequivocal").
189. United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 844 (5th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 513 U.S.
829 (1994).
190. Cf. id. ("The Fourth Amendment does not require police to allow a suspect to draw
first.").
191. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 9.5(b), at 272.
192. Id. at 273 (emphasis in original).
193. See id.
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vis-a-vis the suspect[;]"'" where "the suspect makes threatening move-
ments, as where he quickly thrusts his hand into his waistband with a
metallic-appearing object or where he makes a sudden move to his
pocket notwithstanding a police order to keep his hands in plain
view[;]' '95 where the officer has reason to believe that the suspect may
have a weapon in his hand, then the officer may force open the suspect's
hand or order the suspect to drop it;.96 where the clothing is too bulky so
that a "pat-down is totally inconclusive[;]"19 and in other occasional cir-
cumstances where "it would be, at best, inconclusive."' 98 Try explaining
that rule and its exceptions to the police under the guise that it is de-
signed for its ease of application. Moreover, LaFave's list of exceptions
dissolves upon examination: there appears to be no underlying ration-
ale for the exceptions beyond the need to protect police officers, which
is indistinguishable from the rationale supporting Terry searches in the
first place.
VI. THE PROPER SCOPE OF A PROTECTIVE SEARCH
Three interrelated considerations measure the proper scope of a
protective search. The first, and most important, is the level of assur-
ance the police may obtain in satisfying themselves that the suspect they
are confronting is not armed. As will be discussed, an officer may be
only reasonably assured that the person the officer is confronting is not
armed; this is to say that the police must accept some uncertainty when
confronting suspects. The second concerns the intensity of the search,
which illuminates the limits on the analogy to searches incident to arrest
to protective searches. It will be shown that the intensity of a permissi-
ble protective search is much less than a search incident to arrest. The
third factor refers to limits on the types of weapons for which a search
can be made. Because guns and knives are the weapons of choice for
assaults on police officers, as a general rule, the size of those weapons
limits the areas that can be examined. Within that framework, the in-
quiry as to whether the scope of the protective search is reasonable is
fact-specific to each case.1 9
194. Id. at 272.
195. Id. at 273 (footnote omitted). In the accompanying footnote, LaFave opines, how-
ever, that "it is not enough that the suspect was seen to put something in his pocket surrepti-
tiously." Id. at 273 n.142.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 280.
198. Id. at 40 (1997 Supp.).
199. See United States v. Holifield, 956 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Protective
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A. The Level of Assurance That The Police May Obtain
The level of certainty that an officer may obtain that the person he
or she is confronting is not armed is the most important consideration in
measuring the permissible scope of a protective search for weapons.
Terry spoke of a police officer having an interest in "taking steps to as-
sure himself that the person... is not armed with a weapon"' M and that
the officer is empowered to take "necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon."' ' This language seems
to indicate that a very high level of confidence may be obtained by the
officer. That notion, however, appears to be contradicted by the limited
type of search allowed: the Terry Court stated that the intrusion must
be "reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer."' If the officer can de-
termine if the person is "in fact" carrying a weapon, that level of assur-
ance would justify an extensive examination of the suspect, which seems
at odds with an intrusion "reasonably designed" to discover weapons,
which implies a lower level of assurance that the person is not armed.
The lower courts are split as to the level of assurance that an officer
may obtain. For example, in Smith, the Maryland Court of Appeals re-
jected the ability of the police officer to tug at Smith's shirt after first
patting down Smith's waist band, even though the officer had reason-
able suspicion to believe that Smith was armed and dangerous and that
the gun had been placed under the shirt at the location searched.o The
court reasoned that "'the right to conduct a Terry [frisk] does not give
the police the right to make absolutely sure that no weapon is pres-
ent."' 2°4 The dissent in Smith, also citing Terry, believed that the officer
had the right to assure himself that Smith was not carrying a gun and
that the officer's actions were reasonably related to that quest: "I find
no support for the 'one time and you're out' rule that the majority seems
to fashion. An officer should be permitted to 'double-check' to deter-
mine whether a suspect is armed and to minimize any risk to his or her
searches are only limited in the sense that the officer conducting the protective search must
first have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and the protective search must
be directed only to locations which may contain a weapon and to which the suspect may have
access.").
200. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). Accord Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1047.
202. 392 U.S. at 29.
203. See State v. Smith, 693 A.2d 749,754 (Md. 1997).
204. Id. at 754 (quoting Aguilar v. State, 594 A.2d 1167, 1172 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991)).
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safety."' The dissent in the intermediate appellate court would have
permitted an even greater degree of assurance: "the police officer ought
to be allowed to conduct a thorough protective pat-down search of that
particular area on stopping the suspect, even though a mere cursory pat-
down failed to reveal the object that had been in fact tucked into a shirt-
covered waistband in back of appellant's pants. '
To permit the officer to obtain certainty or a high degree of confi-
dence that the person is not armed would allow the most intrusive of
searches, akin to a search incident to arrest. Such a rule eliminates the
structure that Terry sought to create: for arrests, based on probable
cause, a full search; for stops, based on articulable suspicion, a more
limited intrusion to protect the police during their investigation. This
two-level structure was designed to correlate the need to intrude with
the degree of intrusion, thereby preventing unjustified intrusions into a
person's security. Thus, Terry contemplated a more limited intrusion
than would be obtained if complete assurance were the goal. The level
of justification for an investigatory stop also points to the conclusion
that the police may not obtain absolute assurance that the person is not
armed. Investigative stops are justified by reasonable suspicion that the
person has or is about to commit a crime and a protective search is
similarly justified if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the suspect
is armed and dangerous. Thus, the State's interest, its need, is not as
great as in the search incident to arrest situation. Accordingly, the offi-
cer's level of assurance that the person is not armed should be analogous
to the justification for the protective search. It follows that an officer
must accept some uncertainty whether the person he is confronting is
armed; he can be only reasonably assured that the suspect is not armed.
B. The Limits Of The Analogy To Search Incident To Arrest
Terry and its progeny have often relied on principles developed in
the context of search incident to arrest but whose application to protec-
tive searches is not always proper. For example, the Court in Long re-
lied on cases defining the scope of the area permissibly searched inci-
dent to arrest." The primary case relied on, Chimel v. California, had
205. Id- at 755 (Raker, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
206. Smith v. State, 666 A.2d at 890 (Garrity, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also
State v. Vasquez, 807 P.2d at 524 (holding that "[h]aving the right to conduct a pat-down
search of the jacket, the officer had the right to make the search effective" by reaching into
the pocket).
207. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1048-50.
208. 395 U.S. 752,763 (1969).
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limited the scope of such a search to the arrestee's person and to those
areas where that person might reach in order to grab a weapon or evi-
dentiary item. In so limiting the scope of a search incident to arrest, the
Chimel Court explicitly relied on Terry for the proposition that "a
search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible."' Long also cited another case, New
York v. Belton,2 10 which, in order to establish a "workable rule" for
automobiles, permitted a search of the entire passenger compartment of
the vehicle incident to an arrest and was a mere factual application of
Chimel to the peculiar circumstances of motor vehicle arrests. Long in
many respects simply adopted Belton's per se rule as to the scope of the
area a person may reach or grasp in a vehicle and applied it to the Terry
context.
Given the relationship of the scope of Terry searches and searches
incident to arrest, which are both premised in part on the need to safe-
guard the police from weapons,211 the similarity of the scope of the area
permissibly searched makes sense, as does the Court's reliance on cases
discussing one rule in the context of the other rule. The analogy is well
made between protective searches and searches incident to arrest as to
the area searched because both types of searches depend on a factual
analysis of how far a person may be able to reach and that fact certainly
does not vary based on the police's justification for the search. But that
is the extent to which the analogy has reason. In Terry, however, the
Court used a description of a search incident to arrest when describing a
pat-down:
[T]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the
prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the pris-
oner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area
about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the
feet.21
2
209. Id. at 762 (citation omitted).
210. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,234 (1973).
212. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 17 n.13 (citation omitted). See also Minnesota v. Dicker-
son, 508 U.S. at 381-82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting J. Moynahan, POLICE SEARCHING
PROCEDURES 7 (1963)) (citations omitted):
Check the subject's neck and collar. A check should be made under the subject's
arm. Next a check should be made of the upper back. The lower back should also
be checked.
A check should be made of the upper part of the man's chest and the lower re-
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Yet, the limited intrusion permitted by Terry is to find weapons for
the assault of the police officer and not merely weapons;21 thus, there is
"no reason to cover every square inch of the suspect's body. '214 Rather,
"[t]he need is only to find implements which could readily be grasped by
the suspect during the brief face-to-face encounter, not to uncover items
which are cleverly concealed and which could be brought out only with
considerable delay and difficulty., 21' This is to say that the coincidence
between a search incident to arrest and protective searches relates to the
breadth of the search; it does not relate to the intensity of the search in
the defined area. Thus, for searches incident to arrest, the officer may
search the area and the person arrested as intensively as the officer de-
sires to look for weapons or for evidence. There is no case-by-case
analysis of the permissibility of the intensity of the search; this is be-
cause a search incident to arrest is a per se rule applicable to all ar-
rests,21'6 and justified not only to protect the officer but also to locate evi-
dence. In contrast, a Terry search must be justified by articulable
suspicion in each case217 and its goal is to locate weapons that may be
used to assault the officer while the officer is conducting a brief investi-
gation. Thus, the intensity of the search should not be as great; only lo-
cations where a weapon may be found can be searched. "General ex-
ploratory searches are not permitted, and police officers must
distinguish between the need to protect themselves and the desire to un-
cover incriminating evidence., 218 Moreover, given that the police are
only allowed to be reasonably assured that the person they are investi-
gating is not armed and, given that the level of justification for such pro-
tective searches, articulable suspicion, as compared to the level of justi-
fication for searches incident to arrest, which is probable cause to arrest,
the intensity of a permissible protective search is much less than a search
incident to arrest.
gion around the stomach. The belt, a favorite concealment spot, should be checked.
The inside thigh and the crotch area also should be searched. The legs should be
checked for possible weapons. The last items to be checked are the shoes and cuffs
of the subject.
213. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
214. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 9.5(b), at 274.
215. Id.
216. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-36.
217. See id at 227-28.
218. Smith v. State, 693 A.2d at 751.
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C. Limits Based on Weapons Size
A third limitation on the scope of protective searches relates to
weapons size. Weapons come in a variety of forms and sizes. In a world
where technological innovation continues to confound traditional
Fourth Amendment principles, the police may in the future be con-
fronted with more danger from small but deadly weapons. That is not,
however, the situation typically faced by the police today. Guns and
knives are the weapons of choice for assaults on police officers."9 This
raises the question whether the police should be routinely allowed to
satisfy themselves that the person accosted does not have any weapon,
even a razor blade. Some courts permit such searches but others do not.
Some courts "condone fanciful speculation" on this point. Illus-
trative are cases holding that an object thought to be a cigarette
lighter may be searched for because "it could be used in a dou-
bled up fist as a punch or thrown at the officer or used to burn
the officer or the police unit," that a soft object may be searched
for because it might be "a rubber water pistol loaded with car-
bolic acid or some other liquid, which if used by a suspect could
permanently blind an officer," and that an object thought to be a
shotgun shell could be searched for because it could be deto-
nated by a sharp object and the suspect "might want to explode
the shell even in a way which might entail considerable personal
risk to himself."'
Professor LaFave correctly observes that decisions of this type are
unsound. He maintains that the correct view "reflects two very sensible
considerations: (1) To allow a search for anything which could under
some circumstances be employed as a weapon would be to permit a
search" not dissimilar in intensity from a search incident to arrest; ' and
(2) "[i]n determining what objects might be a weapon, consideration
must be given to what types of objects could be employed in the setting
of the particular case." To these considerations a third should be
added; that is, the principle that an officer may obtain only reasonable
219. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 23-24 ("Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial
portion of the injuries [received by the police] are inflicted with guns and knives.").
220. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 9.5(b), at 277.
221. Id. See also United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520, 522 n.6 (2nd Cir. 1972) ("To
take an extreme example, a razor blade could readily be sewn into clothing, and so support a
purported limited search for weapons which included shredding a suspect's clothing or dis-
mantling his shoes.").
222. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 58, § 9.5(b), at 277.
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assurance that the person is not armed.
Thus, on the one hand, when an officer has particular information
about the nature of the weapon carried by the suspect but none as to its
location, a fairly intrusive search would be permitted if the weapon were
small. For example, if an officer is confronting a person reasonably sus-
pected of using a razor blade as a weapon, then a careful examination to
locate that object is justified?3 On the other hand, when an officer has
no specific information about the possible location of a weapon on the
suspect or any information about the type of weapon the suspect may
have, the search must be limited to fairly large objects such as guns and
knives.' Thus, when an officer, during the course of a protective
search, discovers a matchbox, even though such boxes "could hold a ra-
zor blade," he has no right to open it absent any information that the
suspect is carrying such a weaponm As one judge has reasoned in con-
cluding that an officer exceeded the permissible scope of a protective
search when the officer examined the contents of a man's wallet:
[I]n this case there were no circumstances which would support a
reasonable belief that what the officer felt with his hand con-
tained a weapon. True, it might, and possibly could, contain a
very small but potentially lethal weapon. Nevertheless, it was an
innocuous and ordinary size common men's wallet without any
bulge or other telltale sign, resting in a commonly located place.
The limited authority to intrude.., in a frisk, when the police do
not yet have probable cause, covers objects which may be weap-
ons but not objects which possibly could contain weapons. If that
were the law, then an officer could reach in and retrieve any item
which felt like a container, including anybody's wallet, because
even a very small container could harbor a razor blade."6
223. Cf. State v. Williams, 544 N.W.2d 350,351-54 (Neb. 1996) (police officers permitted
to force open clinched fist of suspect to determine if she had a razor blade or small knife
when investigating report of boy that his mother was being beaten by suspects armed with
knives).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Swann, 149 F.3d 271, 276-77 (4th Cir. 1998) (permissible
to remove object from sock when, during frisk of suspect, officer encountered hard object of
"approximately the same size and shape as a box cutter with a sharp blade, which is often
used as a weapon"); State v. Ashbrook, 586 N.W.2d 503, 508-09 (S.D. 1998) (officer acted
within scope of protective search when he examined containers in car that were large enough
and heavy enough to hold a weapon but did not look into smaller containers).
225. But see Jackson v. State, 804 S.W.2d 735,740 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991).
226. State v. Newton, 489 S.E.2d 147, 152-53 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (Beasley, J., concur-
ring). See also State v. Crook, 485 N.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
removal of hat to search for razor blade or other small weapon improper); People v. Collins,
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This judge's reasoning reflects an analysis of the proper considera-
tions that govern the scope of a protective search. An officer can only
achieve reasonable assurance that the suspect is not armed. Absent in-
formation that the suspect utilizes razor blades or another small
weapon, the officer must accept some uncertainty that the suspect may
be harboring a small weapon. The police cannot search small containers
or other areas based on the speculation that it might contain a small or
atypical weapon absent any information that the suspect is armed with
such a weapon. Otherwise, the balance struck by Terry would be elimi-
nated, and a protective search would be no different in intensity than a
search incident to arrest.
VII. CONCLUSION
A typical protective search is usually limited to an external pat-down
of the suspect's clothing. Indeed, courts often characterize the limits of
a protective search as being either a pat-down or a frisk. However, an
external pat-down is a prototypical Terry frisk; it is not the sole type of
limited intrusion contemplated by Terry and its progeny. The objective
of a protective search is to discover weapons readily available to a sus-
pect that may be used against the officer, not to ferret out carefully con-
cealed items that could be accessed only with some difficulty. Reason-
ableness contemplates that, of a range of options available to an officer,
several options may be acceptable and the mere fact that the officer has
not chosen the most minimally intrusive option or engaged in a prelimi-
nary pat-down does not a fortiori invalidate the officer's actions. In as-
sessing whether the police officer's protective actions are proper, three
interrelated considerations limit the scope of the search. The first and
most fundamental consideration is the level of assurance a police officer
may obtain that the person he or she is confronting is not armed. The
police may not be certain that the person is not carrying any weapon;
they may be only reasonably assured that the person is not armed. Oth-
erwise, as the second concern teaches, the intensity of the search would
be the same as that for searches incident to arrest. Yet, to permit such
searches defeats the purpose of Terry, which had the goal of achieving a
balance between individual interests and governmental interests by lim-
463 P.2d 403, 406 (Cal. 1970) (concluding that an officer cannot exceed the scope of a lawful
pat-down upon speculation that object might be a razor blade or other atypical weapon be-
cause, to do so, "would render meaningless Terry's requirement that pat-downs be limited in
scope absent articulable grounds for an additional intrusion").
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iting such searches. The third factor refers to limits on the types of
weapons for which a search can be made; that is, absent information that
the suspect is armed with an unusual weapon, the officer may search for
only guns, knives, and other commonly used weapons. Within that
framework, the proper scope of a protective search is based on the cir-
cumstances of each case, guided by the principle that the scope of the
protective search must be reasonably related to its purpose.

